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Is Accurate Cost Information A Double-Edged Sword In Competitive 




This  study  investigates  experimentally  how  investments  in  accurate  cost  information  affect 
profits when a competitor also has invested in such type of cost information. On the one hand, 
better insights in the unit costs can lead to better price-setting, higher profit margins and higher 
profits.  In  competitive  interactions,  however,  better  insights  in  the  unit  cost  can  instigate 
competitors to decrease prices until the unit cost without running  a high  risk of  a loss. We 
propose that the effect of symmetry of cost information between competitors depends on the ease 
of  cooperation  between  competitors,  resulting  in  a  disordinal  interaction  between  cost 
information  symmetry  and  ease  of  cooperation.  We  conduct  an  experiment,  manipulating 
whether 1) competitors in a sequential duopoly have both accurate cost information or not, and 
2) ease of cooperation between competitors. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the 
effect  of  cost  information  symmetry  is  moderated  by  the  ease  of  cooperation  between 
competitors. More specific, symmetry of cost information between competitors leads to higher 
profits  when  competitors  can  cooperate  than  when  cooperation  between  competitors  is 
hampered. Further, a detailed analysis of player’s price-setting behavior shows that leaders play 
a pivotal role in exploiting the positive effect of cost information symmetry. The results of this 
paper suggest that imitating competitors with respect to the type of cost information may have 
positive  or  negative  effects,  depending  on  whether  market  conditions  facilitate  or  hamper 











Proponents of investments in accurate cost information argue that the use of such information 
will lead to better price-setting, higher profit margins and higher profits (Kaplan and Cooper 
1998). Although the superiority of accurate cost information is reasonable for a monopolistic 
setting, the question arises whether accurate cost information can overcome the limitations of 
less accurate cost information in competitive settings (Mishra and Vaysman 2001). The aim of 
this paper is therefore to investigate how characteristics related to the competitive environment 
influence the profits that a firm can derive from investments in accurate cost information. 
  Profits in competitive settings are typically determined by the firm’s own prices as well 
as  by  the  prices  of  the  competitor(s).  As  cost  information  generates  focal  points  for  setting 
prices, the own type of cost information as well as the type of cost information of a competitor 
determines the profits that a firm can derive from its investment in accurate cost information. 
Under cost information asymmetry, the competitor still relies on less accurate cost information 
and his distorted price-setting will destroy part of the profit potential of the firm’s investment in 
accurate cost information (Cardinaels et al. 2008). Coexistence of accurate and less accurate cost 
information is not unlikely as Mishra and Vaysman (2001) analytically show that rational cost 
system choice is driven by the information and incentive environment of the firm. 
   However, inspired by the benefits of accurate cost information in monopolistic settings, a 
lot of firms invest in accurate costing systems which leads to situations in which all competitors 
rely on the same accurate cost information. In this respect, previous research has found that 
investments in accurate cost information are not always fully rational and subject to herding 
behavior  (Malmi  1999).  The  effect  of  symmetry  of  cost  information  between  competitors, 
however,  is  not  straightforward.  On  the  one  hand,  symmetry  of  cost  information  can  have 4 
 
positive effects on firm profits as competitors rely on the same focal points to set prices which 
facilitates  the  selection  of  profit-maximizing  prices.  On  the  other  hand,  symmetry  of  cost 
information can have negative effects on firm profits as better insights in the units costs, which is 
an essential characteristic of accurate cost information, can instigate competitors to undercut 
each other’s prices until the unit cost without running a high risk of a loss. Such a competitive 
spiral is less likely if one competes with a firm that relies on less accurate cost information as the 
prospect of an accounting loss can restrain such firms to set lower prices than the unit cost that is 
reported by the less accurate costing system (Cardinaels et al. 2004). This paper proposes that the 
effect  of  cost  information  symmetry  will  depend    on  the  ease  of  cooperation  between 
competitors.  
  Cooperation between competitors is an important theme in industrial organization and a 
major issue for the design of competition policy (Ivaldi et al. 2003; Tirole 1988). In general, 
cooperation  between  competitors  in  order  to  maintain  high  prices  or  to  restrict  output  is 
forbidden to protect consumers. Whether competitors can cooperate or not, is largely determined 
by  the  characteristics  of  the  economic  environment  competitors  are  operating  in  (Feuerstein 
2005;  Holt  1995).  These  characteristics  are  industry-specific  so  that  competitors  in  some 
industries  can  easily  cooperate  with  each  other  while  competitors  in  other  industries  cannot 
cooperate easily. Therefore, we predict that competitors which both have the same accurate cost 
information will use that information differently, depending on the ease of cooperation (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995). In particular, if competitors can easily cooperate with each other, they will 
use the accurate cost information to set prices with higher profit margins so that both players 
obtain  higher  profits.  However,  if  competitors  cannot  cooperate  easily  with  each  other,  the 
accurate cost information will serve as a guide for undercutting the competitor’s prices. This 5 
 
paper provides evidence on this interactive effect of cost information symmetry and ease of 
cooperation on profits in a duopoly setting. 
  We conduct this research using an experiment, in which student participants compete 
anonymously in a sequential duopoly. These participants act as leader or follower and should set 
prices in two markets that differ in the amount of overhead costs. Depending on the experimental 
condition, participants can use accurate or less accurate cost information to set their prices. We 
use  a  2x2  between-subjects  experimental  design.  The  first  independent  variable  is  cost 
information symmetry, which we manipulate by giving only one (i.e. leader or follower) or by 
giving  both  (i.e.  leader  and  follower)  players  in the  duopoly  accurate  cost  information.  The 
second independent variable is ease of cooperation, which we manipulate by varying the degree 
of  observability  of  the  competitor’s  prices  (observable  versus  unobservable)  and  by  varying 
signals of prior cooperation between competitors at the start of the game (competitor’s starting 
prices are close to each other at the start of the game versus no competitor prices at the start of 
the game). 
  Our  results  support  our  hypothesis  that  the  effect  of  cost  information  symmetry  is 
dependent  on  the  ease  of  cooperation.  Specifically,  we  find  that  cost  information  symmetry 
increases  profits  when  competitors  can  easily  cooperate  while  cost  information  symmetry 
decreases  profits  when  competitors  cannot  easily  cooperate.  Results  for  profit  margins  are 
consistent  with  the  results  for  total  profits.  Further  analysis  suggests  that  leaders  play  an 
important role in exploiting the profit-increasing effects of cost information symmetry. More 
specific, leaders should have cooperative intentions and should be able to show these cooperative 
intentions to the follower. Comparisons with a control condition in which both players rely on 
less accurate cost information reveals two important findings. First, if competitors can easily 6 
 
cooperate  with  each  other,  then  firms  can  only  benefit  from  investments  in  accurate  cost 
information  if  their  competitor  has  accurate  cost  information  at  his  disposal.  Second,  if 
competitors cannot easily cooperate with each other, firms can only benefit from investments in 
accurate cost information if their competitor has less accurate cost information. However, prices 
better reflect the true costs if both firms invest in accurate cost information compared to when 
both firms rely on less accurate cost information.  
  This study contributes to the broad stream of accounting research that investigates the 
costs and benefits of accurate cost information. While prior research has shown that the benefits 
of  accurate  cost  information  are  limited  due  to  high  implementation  costs,  the  firm-specific 
incentive and information environment and psychological biases, little is known about the role of 
the competitive environment, which has changed dramatically since accurate cost information 
has become a topic of interest for research and practice (Dearman and Shields 2005; Mishra and 
Vaysman 2001). Only Cardinaels et al. (2008) investigate the role of accurate cost information in 
a competitive setting, but they do not consider variations in the ease of cooperation between 
competitors. This paper takes into account that competitors are often prone to imitation behavior 
which leads to situations where all competitors rely on accurate cost information (Malmi 1999). 
Our results show that the consequences of competing against a competitor that also relies on 
accurate cost information depend on the ease with which competitors can cooperate with each 
other. In general, our results show that ease of cooperation between competitors can serve as an 
additional explanation for the huge variation in benefits that companies derive from investments 
in accurate cost information. 
  By  showing  that  the  effect  of  cost  information  symmetry  depends  on  the  ease  of 
cooperation  between  competitors,  our  research  speaks  to  the  broader  implication  that  firms 7 
 
should consider the unintended consequences of accurate cost information before investing in the 
development of such information. This paper shows that an important unintended consequence 
of  obtaining  better  insights  in  the  unit  cost  is  related  to  a  possible  change  in  competitive 
interactions that is induced by obtaining such insights.   
The  remainder  of  this  paper  consists  of  section  2  developing  the  theory  and  the 
hypothesis to be tested, section 3 describing the experimental design, section 4 presenting the 
results and section 5 offering concluding observations. 
   
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Although  economic  theory  prescribes  that  firms  should  choose  prices  where  marginal  costs 
equates  marginal  revenues,  firms  often  rely  on  their  cost  information  to  set  prices.  Cost 
information  thus  generates  important  focal  points  for  setting  prices.  However,  all  cost 
information  is  not  equal  and  while  some  firms  develop  accurate  cost  information  based  on 
activity-based costing, other firms still rely on less accurate, volume-based costing information 
(Gosselin  2007).  At  this  point,  it  is  worth  noting  that  accurate  cost  information  is  still  an 
approximation of the truth. Previous research has shown that the focal points generated by less 
accurate  cost  information  induces  people  to  take  decisions  that  are  not  wealth-maximizing. 
Cardinaels et al.(2004), for instance, find that subjects with less accurate cost information do not 
follow informative market feedback because doing so would result in an accounting loss under 
the less accurate costing system. In a setting where variations in accounting information refer to 
the emphasis on (economically irrelevant) unavoidable costs, Kachelmeier (1996) shows that a 
purely accounting emphasis on these unavoidable costs leads sellers to ask uncompetitively high 
amounts for their assets.  8 
 
  Competing against competitors with less accurate cost information, a situation that we 
label as cost information asymmetry, implies that competitors use other focal points for setting 
their prices. The presence of multiple focal points will insist competitors to set different prices 
which will reduce the market profits. Furthermore, the distorted price-setting of competitors with 
less accurate cost information will also reduce the profits of the competitor with accurate cost 
information (Cardinaels et al. 2008). Coexistence of accurate and less accurate cost information 
in an economy is not unlikely as the decision to adopt accurate costing systems is driven by the 
firm-specific  incentive  and  informational  environment.  Mishra  and  Vaysman  (2001),  for 
instance, show analytically that not implementing an accurate costing system can be rational as 
managers can use the accurate information to advance their own interests at the disadvantage of 
the owner’s interests.  
  However, decisions to invest in accurate costing systems are not always fully rational. 
Malmi (1999), for instance, shows that adoption of accurate costing systems can be explained by 
imitation  and  herding  behavior.  Firms  that  operate  in  competitive  settings  also  often 
underestimate the power of competition and are prone to imitating the choice of monopolists 
without fully considering how competition influences the benefits one can derive from accurate 
cost information (Moore et al. 2007; Windschitl et al. 2003). Such imitative behavior leads to 
situations  in  which  all  the  competitors  have  accurate  cost  information  at  their  disposal,  a 
situation that we label as cost information symmetry. Cost information symmetry implies that the 
competitors  have the same focal points for setting their prices. As a result, it is less likely that 
the profit potential of investments in accurate costing systems is destroyed by the distorted price-
setting of one of the competitors. Cost symmetry is thus an important requirement for obtaining 
benefits  from  investments  in  accurate  cost  information.  However,  cost  symmetry  is  not  a 9 
 
sufficient condition for realizing profit increases as it instigates two different uses of accurate 
cost information. 
  On the one hand, competitors that both have invested in accurate cost information can use 
this information to set prices that better cover the unit costs and that lead to high profit margins 
(Kaplan and Cooper 1998). This way of using accurate cost information is similar to the use of 
accurate cost information in a monopolistic setting (i.e. both competitors act together as if they 
are a monopolist) and is sustainable as long as no one of the competitors starts undercutting the 
other competitors in order to obtain a larger market share. Competitors that both have invested in 
accurate cost information can, however, also use that information in a competitive way. In this 
case, the better approximation of the true cost can instigate competitors to undercut each other’s 
prices until the unit cost without fearing a loss. In other words, accurate cost information can 
weaken people’s loss aversion that incites them to maintain high prices if they have less accurate 
cost information and do not want to decrease prices in order to avoid an accounting loss (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1991). Importantly, the spiral in which competitors undercut each other’s prices 
until the unit cost will only be observed if both competitors have accurate cost information. That 
is, if one of both players has less accurate cost information then the undercutting spiral will stop 
at the point where the price equals the unit cost derived from the less accurate costing system.  
 
Ease of Cooperation  
We argue that the ease of cooperation will determine whether accurate cost information is used 
in a cooperative or competitive way. Ease of cooperation is a theoretical construct that is derived 
from the literature in industrial organisation and refers to the ease with which competitors can 
start cooperation with each other as well as sustaining their cooperation (Tirole 1988; Scherer 10 
 
1980). Ease of cooperation is determined by factors that are exogenous to the firm such as price 
observability or entry barriers as well as factors that can directly be influenced by the firms such 
as information sharing (Feuerstein 2005). In order to make the experimental design not overly 
complex, we will focus in this paper on variations in the ease of cooperation that are determined 
by exogenous factors. 
The moderating effect of ease of cooperation is derived from the fact that a wide range of 
equilibria are possible in repeated game models and that the setting in which firms compete 
could  make  certain  equilibria  more  focal  than  others  (Mas-Colell  et  al.  1995).  Thus,  if 
competitors can easily cooperate with each other, we expect that competitors will end up in a 
cooperative outcome. Such an outcome is characterized by prices with high profit margins and 
will  increase  profits  compared  to  situations  with  cost  information  asymmetry.  In  this  case, 
competitors  act  together  as  a  monopolist  and  the  benefits  of  accurate  cost  information  in  a 
monopolistic setting are realized. If cooperation between competitors is however not easy, we 
predict that competitors will end in a non-cooperative outcome. In this case, cost information 
symmetry facilitates undercutting of the competitor’s prices and although competitors will use 
their accurate cost information to set prices that better cover the unit costs, profit margins will be 
lower and profits will decrease compared to situations with cost information asymmetry. 
  In summary, we expect that the profit-increasing effect of investments in accurate cost 
information will only be realized if the competitor also has accurate cost information at his 
disposal  and  if  cooperation  with  the  competitor  can  be  easily  started  up  and  sustained.  We 
formalize this prediction in the following hypothesis: 




III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In order to test our hypothesis, we use an experimental design that is based on Cardinaels et al. 
(2008). Their design uses a sequential price-setting duopoly in which a participant has to interact 
with a competitor for multiple periods. Ease of cooperation is however kept constant in their 
design. We will adapt their design by varying the ease of cooperation between competitors. In 
the  following  sections,  we  will  give  information  about  the  model  of  price  competition,  the 
manipulations, the experimental procedures and the manipulation checks. 
 
Model of Price Competition 
Similar to Cardinaels et al. (2008), we use a von Stackelberg model of price competition in two 
markets A and B that differ in the amount of overhead costs. The allocation of the overhead costs 
is manipulated by varying the accuracy of cost information so that the accurate cost information 
better reflects the cost differences between the two markets. Participants can increase profits by 
setting higher prices in market A than in market B (PA>PB). The demand and cost functions are 
exactly the same as in Cardinaels et al. (2008) and are given below.  The subscripts L and F refer 
to the leader and follower, respectively.  
  Sales Volume 
Market A    Qa L (F)  = 5500 – 3.00 Pa L (F)  + 1.05 Pa F (L)       (1a) 
Market B    Qb L (F)  = 2325 – 1.25 Pb L (F)  + 0.30 Pb F (L)        (1b) 
Total    Qtot L (F)  =  Qa L (F)  + Qb L (F)          (1c) 
It is important to mention that both leader and follower face the same underlying cost structure 
(i.e. they have symmetric costs). The direct costs of goods sold are represented by a simple, 12 
 
linear function while a complex, quadratic function is used for representing the indirect costs or 
overhead costs. As can be derived from the coefficients of the cost functions, market A has a 
lower direct cost, but the much higher indirect cost for market A leads to a higher total cost for 
market A than for market B (the fixed overhead costs are higher for market A than for market B, 
the decreasing linear component is smaller for market A than for market B and the quadratic 
coefficient is higher for market A than for market B). 
  Direct Costs 
Market A     Ca L (F) = 630 Qa L (F)            (2a) 
Market B    Cb L (F) = 710 Qb L (F)            (2b) 
Total     Ctot L (F) = Ca L (F) + Cb L (F)          (2c) 
  Overhead Costs 
Market A    OHa L (F)  = 1,750,000 – 410 Qa L (F) + 0.25 Qa
2
 L (F)     (3a)
 
Market B     OHb L (F)  = 700,000 – 515 Qb L (F) + 0.14 Qb
2
 L (F)    (3b) 
Total     OHtot L (F)  = OHa L (F) + OHb L (F)        (3c) 
Equation (4a) shows the total profit function of a participant while equations (4b) and (4c) shows 
the prices and profits in the Nash Equilibrium (NE)  for leaders and followers. Because of the 
second-mover advantage, followers can obtain a slightly higher profit than leaders.  
  Profits and Equilibrium Outcomes 
Total profits   Profittot L (F) = Qa L (F) Pa L (F) + Q b L(F) P b L (F) – Ctot L (F) – OHtot L (F)  (4a) 
NE leader     Pa L  = 1,848.2; Pb L = 1,348.0; Profit tot L = 777,215.8             (4b) 
NE follower   Pa F  = 1,834.4; Pb F  = 1,337.3; Profit tot F  = 790,998.0            (4c) 
Manipulations 
Dispersion of Accurate Cost Information 13 
 
Participants receive a cost report that contains sales volume, revenue, cost and profit figures in 
total and by product market. These measures are also updated after each round of play. Total 
profits can be considered as a reflection of the participant’s performance.   
The way in which the total indirect costs are allocated to the two product markets A and 
B is manipulated by using either a volume-based allocation method (i.e. less accurate) or an 
activity-based allocation method (i.e. accurate). The volume-based allocation method uses total 
volume to calculate the overhead costs per unit of volume. As no difference is made between a 
product from Market A and Market B, the indirect costs per unit of volume is the same in both 
markets.  The  activity-based  allocation  method  first  assigns  the  total  indirect  costs  to  three 
activities (order processing, software installation and delivery) and then assigns the total costs 
per activity to the product markets. The calculation of the overhead costs per unit of volume for 
the volume-based allocation method and for the activity-based allocation method can be found in 
Appendix 1. Appendix 2 shows the cost report that participants with more or less accurate cost 
information receive. Panel A of Table 1 shows the actual overhead costs per unit as well as the 
overhead costs per unit as calculated by using the volume-based and activity-based allocation 
method. Based on our theoretical arguments, we will make a distinction between the condition 
where  only  the  focal  player  (i.e.  leader  or  follower)  has  accurate  cost  information  (i.e. 
asymmetric cost information) and the condition where both players have accurate information 
(i.e. symmetric cost information). 
< insert Table 1 about here > 
Ease of Cooperation 
In Cardinaels et al. (2008), competitors can observe each other’s prices. Fouraker and Siegel 
(1963)  argue  that  prices  are  the  most  basic  form  of  communication  while  Kandori  and 14 
 
Matsushima (1998) provide theoretical support for the conventional wisdom that communication 
facilitates  cooperation  between  competitors.  Taken  together,  the  design  of  Cardinaels  et  al. 
(2008) facilitates cooperation between competitors. We will adapt their design in order to vary 
the ease of cooperation between competitors. 
Our  first  way  of  manipulating  ease  of  cooperation  between  competitors  is  by 
manipulating the observability of each other’s prices. Half of the participants can observe each 
other’s  prices,  while  the  other  part  of  the  participants  cannot  observe  each  other’s  prices. 
Unobservable prices imply that only profits can be used to monitor the competitor’s behavior, 
which will decrease the ease of cooperation between competitors (Stigler 1964).  
  Our  second  way  of  manipulating  cooperation  between  competitors  is  based  on  the 
observation that starting prices in the design of Cardinaels et al. (2008) are very close to each 
other which can instigate cooperative play between competitors. Furthermore, the presence of 
starting prices can induce people to conclude that both competitors have a history with each 
other. Thus, we manipulated ease of cooperation by giving half of the participants the starting 
prices of Cardinaels et al., while the other half of the participants do not receive starting prices. 
For the latter group, we also mentioned during the description of the game that participants have 
to determine prices for products that are introduced into the market for the first time.  It is 
important to mention that participant’s can observe each other’s prices in the conditions where 
no starting prices are given. As such, the absence of starting prices is the only difference with the 
conditions that are replicated from Cardinaels et al. (2008). 
   Panel B of Table 1 shows the different experimental manipulations. The conditions with 
starting prices and observable prices are replicated from Cardinaels et al. (2008) (i.e. Game A 
and B). Game C and D are the conditions where  ease of cooperation is manipulated by making 15 
 
prices unobservable, while Game E and F are the conditions without starting prices. Game A, C, 
and E are the asymmetric cost information – conditions (i.e. only one player has accurate cost 
information).  Game  B,  D,  and  F  are  the  symmetric  cost  information  –  conditions  (i.e.  both 
players have accurate cost information). Similar to Cardinaels et al. (2008), we will analyze the 
results of leader and follower separately. As a result, we have 6 treatments for the leader and 6 
treatments  for  the  follower.  It  is  important  to  mention  that  the  focal  player  in  each  of  the 
treatments has accurate cost information. The difference between the treatments refers to the cost 
information of the competitor (more versus less accurate) and the possibility to cooperate with 
the competitor (yes versus no). 
Experimental Procedures 
Participants  were  master  students  recruited  from  a  cost  accounting  course  at  a  large  West-
European  university  and  have  knowledge  about  cost  allocations  and  pricing  decisions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental treatments and to the role of 
leader or follower. The experiment was organized during different sessions that  have 24 to 36 
participants. Communication during the experiment was strictly forbidden and the large number 
of participants in each experimental session guaranteed that participants cannot determine their 
competitor
2. The experiment lasted on average 50 minutes. Participants receive a course credit 
for participation and the best performing leader and follower of each condition receive a gift 
coupon of 15 EUR. 
  In order to maintain similarity with Cardinaels et al. (2008), we used the same business 
case. Participants had to play the role of a price competitor in the distribution of portable PC’s. 
The case informs participants that clients in market A order slightly less expensive products 
                                                 
2  Previous  research  about  cooperation  between  employees  also  allowed  communication  between  employees  by 
written messages (Zhang 2008; Hannan et al. 2010). As we want to keep the similarity with the design of Cardinaels 
et al. (2008) as high as possible, we opt to not allow communication by written messages. 16 
 
(lower  cost  of  goods  sold),  but  require  much  more  support  than  clients  in  market  B.  Less 
accurate  cost  information  is  labeled  as  ‘volume-based  costing’  and  participants  are  told  that 
overhead  costs are  allocated based on sales volume. Accurate cost information is labeled as 
‘activity-based costing’ and participants are instructed that overhead costs are first assigned to 
activities and then to market A or market B. Participants should be able to infer the quality of 
their  cost  reports  from  the  labels  ‘volume-based  costing’  and  ‘activity-based  costing’. 
Participants are also instructed that both competitors face the same cost structure. 
  The sequence of play in each round is as follows. Both leader and follower observe their 
private  cost  report  during  ten  seconds.  Next,  the  leader  sets  his  prices  for  the  two  markets 
(followers are instructed to wait). Subsequently, the follower sets his prices while leaders are 
instructed to wait. Depending on the experimental condition, the follower can observe the prices 
of the leader before he has to make his price decisions.
3 Markets clear after the price decisions of 
the follower and both players can observe their private cost report as long as they want. At the 
end  of  each  round,  participants  can  always  observe  the  total  profits  of  his  competitor.  The 




An  ex-post  questionnaire  was  used  to  assess  whether  randomization  over  experimental 
conditions was successful and to ensure that participants understand the task and attended to the 
                                                 
3 Making prices unobservable can alter the sequential model of price competition into a simultaneous model of price 
competition. However, Huck and Muller (2000) provide experimental evidence for the fact that the physical timing 
of decisions serves as the most important equilibrium selecting device. Sequential price games without observability 
of prices are frequently observed in practice when a company knows that another company has done a price offer 
without having information about the price offer itself. For instance, a supplier that wants to attract a new buyer 




manipulations.  The questions were answered on a scale from 0 to 100. The means of questions 
about the clarity of the experimental procedure (78.92, t=24.25, p<0.001) and clarity of the price 
setting game (78.68, t=25.84, p<0.001) are significantly larger than the midpoint of 50 and do 
not differ between experimental conditions (p>0.20) or between leaders and followers (p>0.30). 
Participants  were  also  highly  motivated  to  participate  in  this  experiment  (µ=66.13),  enjoyed 
participating in this experiment (µ=73.53) and attributed a high score on a question about the 
realism  of  the  experiment  (µ=57.34).  Again,  responses  do  not  differ  between  experimental 
conditions (p>0.80) nor between leaders and followers (p>0.70) and were significantly larger 
than 50.  We also assessed knowledge about cost accounting with three questions related to 
activity based costing. Participants scored significantly higher than 50 on the average of these 
three questions (µ=72.57, t=21.65, p<0.001) and responses do not differ between experimental 
conditions (p>0.60) nor between leaders and followers (p>0.90). Average age of the participants 
was 21.5  years and we  found no statistical differences between experimental conditions and 
between leaders and followers with respect to age (p>0.80) and number of courses in accounting, 
economics or strategy (p>0.70). 
We also assessed the validity of our experimental manipulations with ex-post questions. The 
questions with respect to cost information are  (1) “The costs per unit that were reported in my 
cost report were an accurate reflection of the real costs per unit” , (2) “The cost report provided 
me with a clear picture about which market was more costly”, and (3) “My cost report provided 
an  accurate  estimation  of  the  total  costs  of  each  market”.    Participants  with  accurate  cost 
information  scored  significantly  higher  on  these  questions  than  participants  that  have  less 
accurate  cost  information  at  their  disposal  (tQuestion1=4.25,  p<0.01;  tQuestion2=6.32,  p<0.01; 
tQuestion3=4.33,  p<0.01).  For  the  conditions  with  asymmetric  information,  we  also  found  that 18 
 
leaders (followers) with accurate cost information have a significantly  higher score on these 
questions than followers (leaders) with less accurate cost information (tQuestion1=2.66, p<0.01;  
tQuestion2=4.43,  p<0.01;  tQuestion3=1.72,  p<0.05  for  leaders  and  tQuestion1=2.60,  p<0.01; 
tQuestion2=4.74, p<0.01; tQuestion3=1.72, p<0.05 for followers). On the other hand, if leaders and 
followers have both accurate cost information at their disposal, we do not find a significant 
difference  between  leaders  and  followers  (tQuestion1=0.07,  p>40;  tQuestion2=0.99,  p>0.15; 
tQuestion3=0.95,  p>0.15).  Taken  together,  we  find  a  significant  difference  for  questions  about 
quality  of  cost  information  if  players  have  different  types  of  cost  information,  while  no 
significant differences are found if both players have accurate cost information.  
The questions with respect to ease of cooperation between competitors are as follows (1) “My 
price strategy was focused on increasing my own profits as much as possible” and (2) “I wanted 
to obtain higher profits than my competitor”.  We found that both leaders and followers that can 
easily cooperate with each other scored significantly lower than leaders and followers that cannot 
easily  cooperate  with  each  other  because  of  unobservable  prices  (tQuestion1=1.86,  p<0.10; 
tQuestion2=2.10,  p<0.05  for  leaders  and  tQuestion1=2.35,  p<0.05  and  tQuestion2=2.03,  p<0.05  for 
followers) and significantly lower than leaders and followers who are not possible to cooperate 
because  of  the  absence  of  starting  prices  (tQuestion1=1.95,  p<0.10;  tQuestion2=2.07,  p<0.05  for 
leaders and  tQuestion1=2.15, p<0.05 and tQuestion2=2.24, p<0.05 for followers). In summary, the 
results of our ex-post tests give us some comfort that experimental procedures were understood 
and that randomization and manipulations were successful. 
IV. RESULTS 
In this section, we first provide formal tests of our hypothesis by using market profits (i.e. total 
profits of leader and follower) as well as by using profits of leader and followers separately. 19 
 
Additional analyses of the price-setting behavior in conditions with cost information symmetry 
are presented to further unravel the results. We also report the results of a control condition in 
which both players have less accurate cost information and conclude this section with some 
robustness checks. 
Market Profits 
As our primary interest is on the moderating effect of the ease of cooperation without making a 
distinction between leader and follower, we will first test our hypothesis by using market profits 
as  the  dependent  variable.  Considering  the  market  as  a  whole  implies  that  we  have  two 
conditions  with  asymmetric  cost  information:  one  condition  in  which  only  the  leader  has 
accurate  cost  information  and  one  condition  in  which  only  the  follower  has  accurate  cost 
information.  As  a  result,  we  have  a  3  (only  leader  accurate  cost  information,  only  follower 
accurate  cost  information,  leader  and  follower  accurate  cost  information)  x  2  (high  ease  of 
cooperation  versus  low  ease  of  cooperation)  experimental  design  for  analyzing  the  market 
profits.  The  results  of  the  ANOVA-analysis  support  our  hypothesis  that  the  effect  of  cost 
information symmetry is moderated by the ease of cooperation: we find evidence for a main 
effect  for  Ease  of  Cooperation  (F=9.90,  p<0.01  for  Experiment  1  and  F=5.52,  p<0.05  for 
Experiment 2) and an interaction effect of Cost Information Symmetry and Ease of Cooperation 
(F=4.70, p<0.05 for Experiment 1 and F=4.16, p<0.05 for Experiment 2) (see Panel B, Table 2).
 4 
Game-by-game comparisons show that market profits of the conditions with asymmetric cost 
information are not significantly different from each other, while the profits of the condition 
where both players have accurate cost information and can cooperate are significantly larger than 
                                                 
4 Experiment 1 refers to the comparison between the cooperation-conditions and conditions with unobservable 
prices. Experiment 2 refers to the comparison between the cooperation conditions and conditions without starting 
prices. 20 
 
the  profits  of  the  condition  where  both  players  have  accurate  cost  information  but  cannot 
cooperate (p<0.01 for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) (see Panel A, Table 2).  
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
Total Profits and Profit Margins 
Table 2 shows the average realized profits for the 12 rounds of play for leaders and followers. An 
ANOVA-analysis  on  the  average  realized  profits  of  leaders  and  followers  supports  our 
hypothesis: we find a significant interaction term for leaders (F=3.45, p<0.10 for Experiment 1; 
F=5.78, p<0.05 for Experiment 2)  as well as for followers (F=5.25, p<0.05 for Experiment 1; 
F=9.86, p<0.01 for Experiment 2) (see Table 3, Panel C and D). Further analysis reveals that 
profits do not significantly differ between conditions with asymmetric cost information (p>0.90 
for the leaders of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 and p>0.50 (p>0.60) for the followers of 
Experiment 1 (Experiment 2)) while there is a significant difference in the predicted direction 
between the  conditions with symmetric cost information (p<0.05 (p<0.01) for the leaders of 
Experiment 1 (Experiment 2) and p<0.01 for the followers of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2).  
A simple effects test shows that leaders’ profits are not significantly different between the two 
conditions  in  which  cooperation  with  the  competitor  is  easy  (p>0.15  for  difference  between 
Game  A  and  Game  B  for  the  leaders).  For  followers  that  can  easily  cooperate  with  their 
competitor, we observe that total profits are significantly higher with symmetric cost information 
compared  to  asymmetric  cost  information  (p<0.01).  If  competitors  cannot  easily  cooperate 
because  of  unobservable  prices,  profits  of  leaders  and  followers  do  not  significantly  differ 
between  the  asymmetric  and  symmetric  cost  information  condition  (p>0.15  for  the  leaders; 
p>0.20 for the followers) (see Table 3, Panel A). If competitors cannot easily cooperate due to 
the absence of starting prices, profits are significantly lower when cost information is symmetric 21 
 
compared  to  when  cost  information  is  asymmetric  (p<0.10  for  the  leaders,  p<0.05  for  the 
followers). These results provide evidence for the moderating role of ease of cooperation when 
both competitors have accurate cost information at their disposal. 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
As the profit margin is an important construct in our theoretical reasoning, we also present the 
results for the profit margins. The  results for profit margins confirm our results of the total 
profits: we find a significant interaction term for leaders (F=3.17, p<0.10 for Experiment 1; 
F=7.09, p<0.01 for Experiment 2) as well as for followers (F=4.47, p<0.05 for Experiment 1; 
F=8,72, p<0.01 for Experiment 2) (see Table 4). The results of the simple effects are similar to 
those of the total profits. 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
Detailed Analysis of Price-Setting Behavior 
Although the results for market profits, profits of leaders and followers and profit margins are 
consistent with our hypotheses, a more detailed analysis of the price-setting behavior is useful to 
explore how the ease of cooperation between competitors influences the results as well as to 
investigate the differences between the two manipulations of ease of cooperation. Following our 
theory, we will focus on the conditions where both players have accurate cost information at 
their  disposal  and  analyze  the  price-setting  behavior  for  the  three  variations  of  ease  of 
cooperation by means of different metrics. PriceDifferenceCompetitors is a first metric and is 
computed  as  the  absolute  value  of  the  price  difference  between  leader  and  follower.  This 
measure is computed separately for market A and B and reflects the extent to which competitors 
coordinate their prices (e.g. |PaLeader – PaFollower|). Second, price level of market A will be reported. 
The price level of market A is useful for deriving insights about the prevalence of cooperation as 22 
 
the  optimal  price  for  market  A  is  higher  than  the  starting  price  and  cooperation  between 
competitors  is  particularly  useful  for  increasing  and  maintaining  high  prices.  Cooperation 
between competitors should thus lead to higher prices for market A than prices in the conditions 
where cooperation is not easy to attain and sustain.
5 Third, PriceDifferenceMarkets is computed 
as the difference between the price for market A and the price for market B for the same subject 
(Pa – Pb) and is a measure for the extent to which differences in indirect costs between both 
markets are reflected in the prices (Cardinaels et al. 2008). As the price for market A is larger 
than  the  price  for  market  B  in  the  equilibrium  solution,  this  measure  should  be  positive  if 
differences in indirect costs are reflected in the prices. Lastly, we also compute metrics for the 
undercutting  and  overpricing  by  leaders  and  followers.  The  calculation  of  these  metrics  is 
consistent with the sequence of decisions for leaders and followers. For the leaders, we compare 
the price of the leader with the price of the follower in the previous round. For the follower, we 
compare  the  price  of  the  follower  with  the  price  of  the  leader  in  the  same  round.  Several 
measures are computed. A large undercut (overpricing) is a price decrease (increase) of more 
than 5% compared to the previous price of the competitor. A close undercut (overpricing) is a 
price decrease (increase) of less than 5% compared to the previous price of the competitor. An 
imitation implies that the previous price of the competitor is perfectly copied. As competitors 
cannot observe each other’s prices in the condition with unobservable prices, the metrics for 
undercutting and overpricing are less useful for this condition.  
Easy To Cooperate Versus UnobservablePrices 
The results for PriceDifferenceCompetitor show that differences between prices of leaders and 
followers  are  significantly  larger  in  the  UnobservablePrices-condition  than  in  the  Easy  To 
                                                 
5 The optimal price for market B is lower than the starting price so that price decreases in market A can be due to 
cooperative intentions or due to competition between competitors. Therefore, we will not report the price levels for 
market B. 23 
 
Cooperate-condition (p<0.01 for market A and market B, see Panel A and C of Table 5). This 
indicates  that  price  coordination  between  leader  and  follower  is  hampered  if  players  cannot 
observe each other’s prices. The prevalence of such large price differences between leaders and 
followers is a first element that can decrease profits. Considering the price level of market A, we 
observe  that  the  leaders’  prices  in  the  UnobservablePrices-condition  are  not  significantly 
different  from  those  in  the  Easy  To  Cooperate-condition  (p>0.10,  see  Panel  A  of  Table  6). 
Followers,  on  the  other  hand,  set  significantly  lower  prices  in  market  A  in  the 
UnobservablePrices-condition than in the Easy To Cooperate-condition (p<0.01, see Panel C of 
Table  6).  Followers  thus  use  a  more  competitive  price-setting  strategy  in  the 
UnobservablePrices-condition than in the Easy To Cooperate-condition, while the price-setting 
strategy of the leaders does not really differ between both conditions. The competitive price-
setting strategy of the followers is confirmed by comparing PriceDifferenceMarkets between the 
both conditions: we observe no significant difference for this metric for the leaders (p>0.20, see 
Panel A of Table 7) while we observe a significant difference for the followers (p<0.05, see 
Panel C of Table 7). As the prices in market B do not really differ between both conditions 
(p>0.50 for the leaders and p>0.40 for the followers, see Panel A and C of Table 6), the results 
for PriceDifferenceMarkets are driven by the price level in market A. Taken together, the results 
for the different metrics show that leaders in the UnobservablePrices-condition have cooperative 
intentions as their price-setting strategy does not differ between the Easy To Cooperate-condition 
and UnobservablePrices-condition. Followers, on the other hand, pursue a competitive price-
setting strategy if they cannot coordinate their prices with the leader. These results imply that 
price  coordination  plays  an  important  role  in  exploiting  the  profit-increasing  effect  of  cost 
information  symmetry.  Indeed,  leaders  in  the  UnobservablePrices-condition  have  cooperative 24 
 
intentions but they cannot show these cooperative intentions to the followers, which leads to 
lower profits for both leader and follower. 
< Insert Table 5, 6, and 7 about here > 
Easy To Cooperate Versus NoStartingPrices 
The results for PriceDifferenceCompetitor, our measure for coordinated price-setting, show that 
differences between prices of leaders and followers for market B are not significantly different 
between the Easy To Cooperate-condition and NoStartingPrices-condition (p>0.15, see Panel C 
of Table 5). However,  PriceDifferenceCompetitor for market A is significantly larger in the 
NoStartingPrices-condition than in the Easy To Cooperate-condition (p<0.10, see Panel A of 
Table  5).  Two  arguments  can  be  put  forward  to  confirm  our  expectation  that  difficulties  to 
coordinate on prices are not the main driver of the low profits in the NoStartingPrices-condition. 
First, close inspection of the round-by-round results for market A shows that the significant 
difference is driven by the first periods (i.e. only period 2, 4 and 5 show a significant difference). 
Second, price coordination difficulties are a smaller issue in the NoStartingPrices-condition than 
in the UnobservablePrices-condition as PriceDifferenceCompetitor is significantly smaller in the 
NoStartingPrice-condition (p<0.01). Inspection of the price level in market A shows that leaders 
and followers in the NoStartingPrices-condition set significantly lower prices compared to the 
Easy To Cooperate-condition (p<0.01 for the leaders; p<0.05 for the followers;  see Panel A en 
C of Table 6). Contrary to the UnobservablePrices-condition, also leaders pursue a competitive 
price-setting  strategy  and  do  not  show  cooperative  intentions.  The  competitive  price-setting 
strategy of leaders and followers in the NoStartingPrices-condition can be confirmed by close 
inspection of the data about undercutting and overpricing. Given the sequential nature of our 
game, followers are assumed to play more competitively and to undercut or imitate the leader 25 
 
quite often. Leaders thus play a pivotal role in installing and sustaining cooperative price-setting 
by closely overpricing the followers. As a result, the number of close overpricings by the leader 
will be used as a measure for the cooperative intentions of the leader. Large undercuts, on the 
other hand, can be considered as a signal for the competitive intentions. 
 In general, the data confirm our expectation that followers act more competitively than 
leaders  as  followers  have  more  large  undercuts  than  leaders  (p<0.01,  not  tabulated)  and  as 
followers  undercut  or  imitate  the  leader  in  more  than  50%  of  their  decisions.  Furthermore, 
follower  behavior  is  qualitatively  similar  in  both  conditions.  Leader  behavior,  however,  is 
different. The results in Panel A of Table 8 show that leaders in the Easy To Cooperate-condition 
are  more  closely  overpricing  the  follower’s  price  than  in  the  NoStartingPrices-condition 
(p<0.05),  while  they  less  use  a  large  undercut  of  the  follower’s  price  than  leaders  in  the 
NoStartingPrices-condition  (p<0.10).  Taken  together,  leaders  in  the  Easy  To  Cooperate-
condition  are  more  cooperative,  while  leaders  in  the  NoStartingPrices-condition  act 
competitively.  Although  followers  in  the  Easy  To  Cooperate-condition  are  still  somewhat 
competitive and often closely undercut the price of the leader, leaders in the Easy To Cooperate-
condition  take  into  account  this  strategy  of  the  followers  by  more  closely  overpricing  the 
followers (p<0.05) and less imitating the follower’s price of the previous period (p<0.05) than 
leaders in the NoStartingPrices-condition. As such, leaders and followers evolve towards higher 
prices and profits. In the NoStartingPrices-condition, however, competitive leaders are matched 
with  competitive  followers  which  results  in  low prices  and  low  profits.  Taken  together,  our 
results show that leaders play a pivotal role in exploiting the profit-increasing effect of cost 
information symmetry: leaders should have cooperative intentions and they should be able to 
show these cooperative intentions to the follower.  26 
 
< Insert Table 8 about here > 
Additional Analyses 
In this section, we report results of additional tests that both lend robustness and extend the 
reported results. 
Outperforming the Competitor? 
Although our evidence provides support for our theory, it could be that the participant’s pricing 
decisions are driven by the relative position against the competitor instead of the absolute level 
of  profits  (Armstrong  and  Huck  2009).  As  participants  are  not  informed  about  the  optimal 
profits, concerns about the relative position are not unlikely. If this is the case, then the profits in 
the different conditions should be interpreted with care.  However, analyses show that players 
with  accurate  cost  information  never  outperform  their  competitor  with  less  accurate  cost 
information. Profits of competitors do also not significantly differ if both players have accurate 
cost information. As a result, satisfaction with a significantly higher profit cannot serve as an 
explanation for our results. 
Control Condition: both Players Less Accurate Cost Information 
We  have  also  run  a  control  condition  with  cost  information  symmetry  of  less  accurate  cost 
information (i.e. both players less accurate cost information). We have 21 leaders and followers 
in  the  Easy  To  Cooperate-condition,  22  leaders  and  followers  in  the  UnobservablePrices-
condition and 18 leaders and followers in the NoStartingPrices-condition. If cooperation is easy, 
we observe no significant profit differences between less accurate cost information symmetry – 
condition and the cost information asymmetry condition (p>0.15 for the leaders and p>0.30 for 
the followers, see Panel A of Table 9). This result can be explained by the fact that the low 
barrier to cooperate makes it possible for competitors to learn to set better prices although both 27 
 
players  have  less  accurate cost  information  (Waller  et  al.  1999).  In  the  UnobservablePrices-
condition,  leaders  significantly  improve  their  profits  if  only  they  invest  in  accurate  cost 
information (p<0.01, see Panel A of Table 9). Followers in the UnobservablePrices-condition, on 
the other hand, cannot improve profits if only he invests in accurate cost information (p>0.30, 
see  Panel  A  of  Table  9).  Leaders  and  followers  in  the  NoStartingPrices-condition  can 
significantly  improve  their  profits  if  they  invest  in  accurate  cost  information  while  their 
competitor  does  not  invest  in  such  information  (p<0.10  for  the  leader  and  p<0.01  for  the 
follower,  see  Panel  A  of  Table  9).  In  line  with  our  theory,  leaders  and  followers  in  the 
Cooperation-condition can significantly increase their profits compared to the control condition 
if they both invest in accurate cost information(p<0.01 for leaders and followers). Profits of 
leaders and followers in the UnobservablePrices- and NoStartingPrices-condition, however, do 
not significantly differ between the condition where both players have accurate cost information 
and the condition where both have the less accurate information (p>0.10 (p>0.70) for leaders 
(followers) in the UnobservablePrices-condition; p>0.90 (p>0.50) for leaders (followers) in the 
NoStartingPrices-condition). Taken together, leaders or followers that invest in accurate cost 
information  will prefer that their competitors do the same if cooperation is possible, while they 
will prefer that their competitors do not invest in accurate cost information if cooperation is not 
possible. However, further analysis of the low profits if both competitors have the same cost 
information  (i.e.  both  less  accurate  or  more  accurate  cost  information)  and  cannot  easily 
cooperate shows that the condition in which both competitors have accurate cost information is 
preferable  from  a  welfare  perspective.  Statistics  about  PriceDifferenceMarkets,  for  instance, 
show that the price difference between market A and B is significantly larger if both competitors 
have  accurate cost information then in the condition where both competitors have less accurate 28 
 
cost information (p<0.05 for leaders of Experiment 1; p<0.10 for followers of Experiment 1; 
p<0.01  for  leaders  and  followers  of  Experiment  2).  In  other  words,  the  low  profits  if  both 
competitors have accurate cost information are from higher quality because the prices better 
reflect the cost differences between the markets.  
< insert Table 9 about here > 
Alternative Econometric Specification 
As some players occasionally set ridiculously high or low prices, we delete for each player the 
round with the lowest and the highest profit and calculate the average profit of the ten remaining 
rounds. We rerun our analyses and find the same results. Instead of averaging the profits of each 
player, we also run analyses where each round is considered as an independent observation. We 
use player-clustered standard errors and control for round-effects by introducing a main term for 
round  an  all  possible  interaction    terms  between  round  and  the  independent  variables 
InformationCompetitor and Collusion. Our results do not change. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
Previous research has shown that the benefits of accurate cost information are diminished in 
simple  settings,  due  to  psychological  biases,  availability  of  other  information  and  strategic 
interactions (Briers et al. 1999; Cardinaels et al. 2008; Dearman and Shields 2005). Our study 
shifts the focus to characteristics of the competitive environment and starts from the assumption 
that  the  competitor’s  cost  information,  which  generates  focal  points  for  price-setting,  can 
influence the profits that a firm  can derive from its investment in accurate  costing systems. 
Specifically,  our  experimental  study  shows  that  a  firm,  which  has  invested  in  accurate  cost 
information, will be able to increase its profits if the competitor also invests in accurate cost 29 
 
information.  However,  this  profit-increasing  effect  will  only  be  observed  if  competitors  can 
easily  cooperate with each other. More specific, (market)  profits increase if competitors can 
easily cooperate with each other, while (market) profits decrease if cooperation is not easy to 
attain  and  to  sustain.  This  disordinal  interaction  occurs  because  competitors  that  both  have 
invested in accurate cost information use that information differently depending on the easiness 
to which they can cooperate with each other. More specific, accurate cost information is used  to 
set better prices with higher profit margins if competitors can easily cooperate with each other. 
However, if cooperation between competitors is not easy to initiate and to sustain, competitors 
use the accurate cost information to undercut each other’s prices until the unit cost. 
  Our additional analyses show that leaders play a pivotal role in the exploitation of the 
profit-increasing effect if both leader and follower have invested in accurate cost information. 
More  specific,  our  data  suggest  that  the  profit-increasing  effect  requires  that  leaders  have 
cooperative  intentions,  and  that  they  can  show  these  cooperative  intentions.  Another  set  of 
additional analyses shows that profits do not significantly differ between conditions with cost 
symmetry of accurate cost information and cost symmetry of less accurate cost information but 
prices better reflect the true costs if both competitors have accurate cost information.  
Our results are especially relevant given the empirical and anecdotal evidence suggesting 
that  firms  imitate  other  firms  when  deciding  about  implementation  of  accurate  cost  systems 
(Malmi 1999). It is thus not unlikely that firms end up in a situation where all competitors have 
accurate  cost  information  at  their  disposal.  As  our  results  show,  profits  in  this  situation  are 
determined by the easiness to which competitors can cooperate with each other. We let it as a 
question for future research whether competitors that both have accurate cost information are 
aware of this unintended consequence and whether they will explicitly search for cooperation in 30 
 
order to avoid the low profits when cooperation is not a priori possible. Our results also provide 
(partial)  evidence  that  the  first  wave  of  ABC-adopters  has  made  an  efficient  choice  as 
comparisons  with  a  control  condition  in  which  both  players  have  the  less  accurate  cost 
information show that firms which are the first to invest in accurate cost information can increase 
their profits, but only if cooperation between competitors is not possible.  
More generally, our results imply that firms should be aware of the characteristics of their 
competitive environment before implementing accurate costing systems. More specific, firms 
should  be  aware  that  results  from  monopolistic  settings  cannot  be  extended  to  competitive 
settings without taking into account the complex interactions of such settings. Unfortunately, 
prior research has shown that people are not good in predicting the effect of competition.  
This study has its limitations which provide opportunities for further research. First, our 
experimental design keeps the price sensitivity of the markets constant across conditions. Further 
research can examine whether the results change if players compete in markets with higher price 
sensitivities.  Second,  our  additional  analyses  have  shown  that  leaders  play  a  pivotal  role  in 
exploiting  the  profit-increasing  effects  of  cost-symmetry.  Future  research  would  do  well  to 
explore  the  role  of  leaders  in  competitive  interactions.  One  avenue  for  future  research  is  to 









Armstrong, M., and S. Huck. 2009. Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A 
Primer. CESIFO Working Paper. 
Cardinaels, E., F. Roodhooft, and L. Warlop. 2004. The Value of Activity-Based Costing 
in Competitive Pricing Decisions. Journal of Management Accounting Research 16:133-148. 
Cardinaels, E., F. Roodhooft, L. Warlop, and G. Van Herck. 2008. Competitive Pricing in 
Markets with Different Overhead Costs: Concealment or Leakage of Cost Information. Journal 
of Accounting Research 46(4): 761-784. 
Dearman, D.T., and M.D. Shields. 2005. Avoiding Accounting Fixation: Determinants of 
Cognitive Adaptation to Differences in Accounting Method. Contemporary Accounting Research 
22(2): 351-384. 
Fouraker, L.E., and S. Siegel. 1963. Bargaining Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Gosselin, M. 2007. A Review of Activity-Based Costing: Technique, Implementation and 
Consequences. In Handbook of Management Accounting Research, edited by C.S. Chapman, 
A.G. Hopwood, and M.D. Shields. Elsevier. 
Hannan, R.L., K.L. Towry, and Y. Zhang. 2010. Mutual Monitoring in Tournaments: The 
Moderating Effect of Goal Orientation. Working Paper Georgia State University, Emory 
University, Northeastern University. 
Holt, C. 1995. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research. In Handbook 
of Experimental Economics, edited by J.H. Kagel, and A. E. Roth. Princeton University Press. 
Huck, S., and W. Müller. 2000. Perfect versus Imperfect Observability – An 
Experimental Test of Bagwell’s Result. Games and Economic Behavior 31: 174-190. 
Ivaldi, M., B. Julien, P. Rey, P. Seabright, and J. Tirole. 2003. The Ecnomics Of Tacit 
Collusion. Report for DG Competition, European Commission. 
Kachelmeier, S.J. 1996. Do Cosmetic Reporting Variations Affect Market Behavior? A 
Laboratory Study of the Accounting Emphasis on Unavoidable Costs. Review of Accounting 
Studies 1: 115-140. 
Kandori, M., and H. Matsushima. 1998. Private Observation, Communication, and 
Collusion. Econometrica 66(3): 627-652. 
Kaplan, R.S., and R. Cooper. 1998. Cost and Effect. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Malmi, T. 1999. Activity-based costing diffusion across organizations: an exploratory 
empirical analysis of Finnish firms. Accounting, Organizations and Society 24:649-672. 
Mas-Colell, A., M.D. Whinston, and J.R. Green. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford 
University Press. 
Moore, D.A., J.M. Oesch, and C. Zietsma. 2007. What Competition? Myopic Self-Focus 
in Market-Entry Decisions. Organization Science 18(3): 440-454. 
Mishra, B., and I. Vaysman. 2001. Cost System Choices and Incentives – Traditional vs. 
Activity-Based Costing. Journal of Accounting Research 39(3): 619-641. 
Potters, J. 2009. Transparency about past, present and future conduct. In Experiments and 
Competition Policy, edited by J. Hinloopen, and H.T. Normann. Cambridge University Press.  32 
 
Scherer, F. 1980. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. Chicago: 
Rand McNally College Publishing. 
Spiegel, M.I., and H. Tookes. 2010. Dynamic Competition, Valuation, and Merger 
Activity. Working Paper Yale University. 
Stigler, G. 1964. A Theory of Oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy 72(1): 44-61. 
Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1991. Loss aversion in riskless choice: a reference-
dependent model. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4): 1039-1061. 
Waller, W., B. Shapiro, and G. Sevcik. 1999. Do cost-based pricing biases persist in 
laboratory markets?. Accounting, Organizations and Society 24: 717-739. 
Windschitl, P.D., J. Kruger, and E.N. Simms. 2003. The Influence of Egocentrism and 
Focalism on People’s Optimism in Competitions. When What Affects Us Equally Affects Me 
More. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85(3): 389-408. 
Zhang, Y. 2008. The Effects of Perceived Fairness and Communication on Honesty and 
































Overview of the Experimental Design 
Participants act either as leader (first mover) or follower (second mover) and set prices for the two product markets 
that have different indirect costs. After each round, total profits are made public and participants receive an updated 
private cost report. Only participants in the NoCollusion-treatment of Experiment 1cannot view each other’s prices 
in the product markets after each round. Given the assumption that indirect costs per product market (equations 3a 
and 3b) are unobservable, the cost reports use a cost allocation method (see appendix A) to account for differences 
in the indirect costs per product market. We manipulate these cost reports as either being less accurate (product 
markets receive per unit of volume an equal amount of indirect costs) or more accurate (product market A is shown 
to be more costly than market B) in a fully crossed 2x2 design. Panel A shows the unit costs that are shown under a 
less or more accurate cost report  in comparison to the actual costs at the start of the experiment (e.g. for the leader 
using  the  initial  prices  of  Experiment  1  Pa  L=1650;  Pb  L=1710;  Pa  F  =1645;  Pb F=1706).  Panel  B  shows  our 
experimental treatments.  




Type of cost  
Actual Cost  
Market A versus B 
Low-quality cost report  
Market A versus B 
High-quality cost report  
Market A versus B 
Direct cost per unit  630.0 < 710.0  630.0 < 710.0  630.0 < 710.0 
Indirect cost per unit  927.8 > 583.9 
(Equations 3a and 3b) 
847.0 = 847.0 
(Appendix A) 
956.1 > 491.8 
(Appendix A) 
Total unit cost ‘U’  1,557.8 > 1,293.9  1,477.0 < 1,557.0  1,586.1 > 1,201.8 
 
Panel B: overview of the experimental treatments 
Experiment 1 




21 Leaders/21 Followers 
Focal Player: U(Market A) > U(Market B) 
Competitor: U(Market A) < U(Market B) 
Game B 
18 Leaders/18 Followers 
Focal Player: U(Market A) > U(Market B) 
Competitor: U(Market A) > U(Market B) 





22 Leaders/22 Followers 
Focal Player: U(Market A) > U(Market B) 
Competitor: U(Market A) < U(Market B) 
Game D 
21 Leaders/21 Followers 
Focal Player: U(Market A) > U(Market B) 
Competitor: U(Market A) > U(Market B) 




18 Leaders/17 Followers 
Focal Player: U(Market A) > U(Market B) 
Competitor: U(Market A) < U(Market B) 
Game F 
17 Leaders/17 Followers 
Focal Player: U(Market A) > U(Market B) 




Cost Information Asymmetry (Both Players Less Accurate Cost Information) 
Focal Player: U(Market A) < U(Market B) 
Competitor: U(Market A) < U(Market B) 
Cooperation  21 Leaders/21 Followers 
Unobservable Prices  22 Leaders/22 Followers 
NoStartingPrices  18 Leaders/18 Followers 
 
 
                                                 
6 Adapted from Cardinaels et al. (2008) 34 
 
TABLE 2 
Market Profits Experiment 1 and 2 
Panel A shows the average realized market profits for the 12 rounds of play per experimental treatment. Comparison 
of the averages is based on a Tukey-Kramer test which controls for the fact that multiple pairwise comparisons are 
executed. Panel B contains the ANOVA-analysis. Panel C presents a graph of the average realized market profits. 
Panel A: Market Profits 









     
 



















































     
             
Panel B:  ANOVA-results for Market Profits Experiment 1 and 2 




  F-statistic  p-value  F-statistic  p-value 
EaseOfCooperation  9.80  <0.01  5.52  0.02 
CostInformationSymmetry  0.57  0.58  0.15  0.86 
EaseOfCooperation x 
CostInformationSymmetry 
4.70  0.01  4.16  0.02 
F-statistic Model  3.82  <0.01  2.71  <0.01 
R²  13.82%  11.33% 















EasyToCooperate UnobservablePrices NoStartingPrices35 
 
TABLE 3 
 Total Profits  
Panel A shows the average realized profits for leaders and followers for the 12 rounds of play per experimental 
treatment. Comparison of the averages is based on a Tukey-Kramer test which controls for the fact that multiple 
pairwise  comparisons  are  executed.  Panel  B  presents  a  graph  of  the  average  realized  profits  for  leaders  and 
followers. Panel C and D show the results of the ANOVA-analysis on Total Profits. The dependent variable is the 
average profit for the 12 rounds of play. 
Panel A: Total Profits Leaders and Followers 




















+ 40,803.43 (p=0.18) 














- 61,196.56 (p=0.18) 























+ 1,041.74 (p=0.98) 
- 23,288.51 (p=0.55) 
Game B-D 
- 100,958.26 (p=0.02) 
-147,117.335 (p<0.01) 
 










































Panel C: ANOVA-results Total Profits Easy To Cooperate Versus Unobservable Prices 
  Leaders  Followers 
  F-statistic  p-value  F-statistic  p-value 
Ease Of Cooperation  3.31  0.07  9.95  <0.01 
Cost Information Symmetry  0.14  0.71  0.12  0.73 
EaseOfCooperation x 
CostInformationSymmetry 
3.45  0.07  5.25  0.03 
F-statistic Model  2.23  0.09  4.84  <0.01 
R²  7.9%  15.68% 
 
 
Panel D: ANOVA-results Total Profits Easy To Cooperate Versus No Starting Prices 
 
 
  Leaders  Followers 
  F-statistic  p-value  F-statistic  p-value 
Ease Of Cooperation  5.04  0.03  6.14  0.02 
Cost Information Symmetry  1.94  0.17  0.64  0.43 
EaseOfCooperation x 
CostInformationSymmetry 
5.78  0.02  9.86  <0.01 
F-statistic Model  4.01  0.01  5.31  <0.01 





























 Profit Margins 
Panel  A  shows  the  average  realized  profit  margins  for  leaders  and  followers  for  the  12  rounds  of  play  per 
experimental treatment. Comparison of the averages is based on a Tukey-Kramer test which controls for the fact that 
multiple pairwise comparisons are executed. Panel B presents a graph of the average realized profit margins for 
leaders and followers. Panel C and D show the results of the ANOVA-analysis on Profit Maring. The dependent 
variable is the average profit margin for the 12 rounds of play. 
Panel A: Profit Margins Leaders and Followers 








































































































Easy To Cooperate Unobservable Prices
No Starting Prices38 
 
Panel C: ANOVA-results Profit Margins Easy To Cooperate Versus Unobservable Prices 
  Leaders  Followers 
  F-statistic  p-value  F-statistic  p-value 
Ease Of Cooperation  4.03  0.05  10.89  <0.01 
Cost Information 
Symmetry 
0.00  0.95  0.10  0.75 
EaseOfCooperation x 
CostInformationSymmetry 
3.17  0.08  4.47  0.03 
F-statistic Model  2.30  0.08  4.90  <0.01 
R²  8.12%  15.85% 
 
Panel D: ANOVA-results Profit Margins Easy To Cooperate Versus No Starting Prices 
 
  Leaders  Followers 
  F-statistic  p-value  F-statistic  p-value 
Ease Of Cooperation  5.10  0.03  5.22  0.03 
Cost Information 
Symmetry 
2.19  0.14  0.84  0.36 
EaseOfCooperation x 
CostInformationSymmetry 
7.09  <0.01  8.72  <0.01 
F-statistic Model  4.52  <0.01  4.71  <0.01 

























Price Differences Between Leader and Follower (PriceDifferenceCompetitors) 
Panel A and Panel C show the average value of PriceDifferenceCompetitors (= |PaLeader – PaFollower|) for each round 
for market A and market B. The differences between the three conditions are expressed in absolute values. *, **, and 
***  denote  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%,  and  1%,  respectively.  Panel  B  and  Panel  D  present  a  graph  of 
PriceDifferenceCompetitors for market A and B. 
Panel A: Average Values for PriceDifferenceCompetitor of Market A 





















1  33,94  104,10  76,59  70,15***  42,64  27,51 
2  34,17  165,95  97,12  131,79***  62,95**  68,83 
3  30,06  124,05  72,65  93,99***  42,59  51,40 
4  42,39  156,33  96,59  113,94***  54,20*  59,75 
5  26,06  121,90  95,18  95,85***  69,12**  26,73 
6  50,94  88,71  63,06  37,77  12,11  25,66 
7  55,78  121,52  86,29  65,75*  30,52  35,23 
8  62,89  89,62  42,65  26,73  20,24  46,97* 
9  64,00  117,19  53,48  53,19  10,52  63,71* 
10  69,39  92,00  80,94  22,61  11,55  11,06 
11  40,06  107,52  73,35  67,47***  33,30  34,17 
12  74,33  122,76  68,94  48,43*  5,39  53,82* 
Average  48,67  117,64  75,57  68,97***  26,90*  42,07** 
 












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
EasyToCooperate UnobservablePrices NoStartingPrices40 
 
 
Panel C: Average Values for PriceDifferenceCompetitor of Market B 
 



















1  42,00  110,95  80,82  68,95**  38,82  30,13 
2  48,39  128,14  63,18  79,75**  14,79  64,97* 
3  23,83  143,48  102,47  119,64***  78,64*  41,01 
4  66,56  171,81  98,24  105,25**  31,68  73,57 
5  57,44  191,43  69,24  133,98***  11,79  122,19*** 
6  56,89  152,90  86,76  96,02***  29,88  66,14 
7  53,56  159,38  60,12  105,83**  6,56  99,26** 
8  56,72  202,71  76,71  145,99***  19,98  126,01*** 
9  52,28  204,95  64,82  152,67***  12,55  140,13*** 
10  40,44  212,90  45,88  172,46***  5,44  167,02*** 
11  52,17  205,81  87,47  153,64***  35,30  118,34*** 
12  58,83  187,67  88,00  128,83***  29,17  99,67** 
Average  50,76  172,68  76,98  121,92***  26,22  95,70*** 
 
 












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
EasyToCooperate UnobservablePrices NoStartingPrices41 
 
TABLE 6 
Price Market A 
Panel A and Panel C show the average value of the price of market A for each round of leaders and followers. The 
differences between the three conditions are expressed in absolute values. *, **, and *** denote significance levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Panel B and Panel D present a graph of prices for market for leaders and 
followers. 
Panel A: Average Values for Prices Market A Leaders 





















1  1694,22  1658,00  1738,76  36,22  44,54  80,76* 
2  1698,83  1659,00  1634,35  39,83  64,48  24,65 
3  1731,11  1672,67  1576,65  58,44  154,46***  96,02* 
4  1752,22  1739,67  1565,24  12,56  186,99***  174,43*** 
5  1745,61  1676,38  1590,05  69,23  155,56***  86,33 
6  1734,72  1673,19  1635,58  61,53*  99,15**  37,61 
7  1745,17  1693,52  1566,65  51,64  178,52***  126,88** 
8  1736,17  1708,29  1634,82  27,88  101,34**  73,46 
9  1745,50  1713,05  1669,12  32,45  76,38  43,93 
10  1763,83  1678,71  1652,18  85,12**  111,66*  26,54 
11  1723,06  1704,95  1657,65  18,10  65,41  47,31 
12  1712,94  1718,24  1653,24  5,29  59,71  65,00 
Average  1731,95  1691,31  1631,19  40,64  100,76***  60,12* 
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Panel C: Average Values for Prices Market A Followers 



















1  1670,83  1655,52  1721,00  15,31  50,17  65,48 
2  1703,67  1603,81  1631,94  99,86**  71,73  28,13 
3  1707,72  1623,10  1588,24  84,63**  119,49**  34,86 
4  1740,50  1643,43  1639,24  97,07***  101,26*  4,19 
5  1738,56  1672,86  1629,69  65,70  108,86**  43,16 
6  1730,78  1685,90  1624,99  44,87  105,79*  60,92 
7  1758,83  1634,86  1613,88  123,98**  144,95**  20,97 
8  1721,17  1643,62  1647,47  77,55**  73,70  3,85 
9  1701,61  1636,71  1659,17  64,90**  42,44  22,46 
10  1723,56  1644,52  1650,18  79,03**  73,38  5,65 
11  1710,67  1657,33  1703,35  53,33*  7,31  46,02 
12  1693,28  1675,00  1680,88  18,28  12,40  5,88 
Avera
ge  1716,76  1648,06  1649,17  68,71***  67,59**  1,11 
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TABLE 7 
Price Differences Between Market A and Market B (PriceDifferenceMarket) 
Panel A and Panel C show the average value of PriceDifferenceMarket (= |PaLeader – PbLeader|) for each round for 
leaders and followers. The differences between the three conditions are expressed in absolute values. *, **, and *** 
denote  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%,  and  1%,  respectively.  Panel  B  and  Panel  D  present  a  graph  of 
PriceDifferenceMarket for leaders and followers. 
Panel A: Average Values for PriceDifferenceMarket of Leaders 
 



















1  -33,00  -32,86  169,76  0,14  202,76***  202,62** 
2  3,83  -32,14  250,06  35,98  246,23**  282,20*** 
3  52,83  6,38  218,29  46,45  165,46*  211,91*** 
4  113,78  80,90  239,18  32,87  125,40*  158,27*** 
5  96,28  41,48  209,34  54,80  113,06*  167,86** 
6  100,50  39,90  258,75  60,60  158,25**  218,85*** 
7  153,89  40,52  207,47  113,37  53,58  166,95*** 
8  190,11  66,90  245,06  123,21*  54,95  178,15*** 
9  185,94  69,76  262,29  116,18*  76,35  192,53*** 
10  217,22  60,24  282,88  156,98**  65,66  222,64*** 
11  140,78  114,62  284,12  26,16  143,34**  169,50*** 
12  165,61  129,05  305,82  36,56  140,21**  176,78*** 
Average  115,65  48,73  244,42  66,92  128,77**  195,69*** 
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Panel C: Average Values for PriceDifferenceMarket of Followers 
 




















1  -15,50  -73,62  206,94  58,12  222,44***  280,56*** 
2  10,72  -93,10  240,24  103,82  229,51***  333,33*** 
3  50,94  -51,14  229,88  102,09  178,94***  281,03*** 
4  71,94  -4,86  277,18  76,80  205,23***  282,03*** 
5  133,22  8,33  269,99  124,89*  136,77**  261,65*** 
6  127,11  49,24  243,64  77,87  116,52*  194,40*** 
7  208,78  63,24  294,82  145,54*  86,05  231,59*** 
8  209,61  80,10  250,76  129,52**  41,15  170,67*** 
9  183,22  67,62  285,99  115,60*  102,77*  218,38*** 
10  195,17  83,33  290,29  111,83*  95,13*  206,96*** 
11  169,00  92,33  291,18  76,67  122,18**  198,84*** 
12  198,11  93,29  316,18  104,83  118,07**  222,89*** 
Avera
ge  128,53  26,23  266,42  102,30**  137,90***  240,19*** 
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TABLE 8 
Overpricing and Undercutting 
Panel  A  shows  the  average  number  of  total  undercuts,  large  undercuts,  close  undercuts,  imitations,  close 
overpricings, large overpricings, and total overpricings for leaders and followers. *, **, and *** denote significance 
levels  of  10%,  5%,  and  1%,  respectively.  Panel  B  and  Panel  C  presents  a  graph  of  the  average  number  of 
overpricings and undercuttings for leaders and followers.  
 
Panel A: Overpricing and Undercutting Leaders and Followers 
 
    Easy To 
Cooperate 





Leaders  9,17  10,76  1,60 
Followers  17,61  10,94  6,67*** 
Leaders Versus 
Followers 
8.44***  0.18   
 
Large Undercuts 
Leaders  2,56  4,53  1,97* 
Followers  3,33  3,82  0,49 
Leaders Versus 
Followers 
0.77  0.71   
 
Close Undercuts 
Leaders  6,61  6,24  0,38 
Followers  14,28  7,12  7,16*** 
Leaders Versus 
Followers 
7.67***  0.88   
 
Imitation 
Leaders  1,67  3,88  2,22** 
Followers  2,33  4,94  2,61* 
Leaders Versus 
Followers 




Leaders  7,22  3,76  3,46** 
Followers  2,61  4,00  1,39 
Leaders Versus 
Followers 




Leaders  3,94  3,59  0,36 
Followers  1,44  4,12  2,67** 
Leaders Versus 
Followers 
2.5*  0.53   
 
Total Overpricings 
Leaders  11,17  7,35  3,81** 
Followers  4,06  8,12  4,06** 
Leaders Versus 
Followers 





























































Comparisons with Control Condition 
Panel A shows, for Experiment 1, the average realized profits for leaders and followers for the 12 rounds of play 
with the control treatment included. Panel B contains the same statistics for Experiment 2. Comparison of the 
averages  is  based  on  a  Tukey-Kramer  test  which  controls  for  the  fact  that  multiple  pairwise  comparisons  are 
executed. Panel C and D present a graph of the average realized profits for leaders and followers with the control 
condition included. 
Panel A: Total Profits Leaders and Followers with Control Condition  



















































































     













     
             






































2,277.25*2,521,118  1,928,815 699.3 x 2,521,118 592,302
2,277.25+699.3 2,277.25+699.3





Allocation Method for Accurate and Less Accurate Cost Reports 
 
We allocate the costs for the leader using the initial prices of Experiment 1 (Pa L=1650; Pb L=1710 for the leader and 
Pa F =1645; Pb F=1706 for the follower). The total indirect cost, calculated via equation 3c, is then equal to 2,521,118. 
A less accurate cost report uses sales volume (Qa and Qb, calculated via equations 1a and 1b) to allocate this total 
indirect cost to the two product markets. Accordingly, the two product markets have the same amount of indirect 
costs per unit of volume. A more accurate cost report divides this overhead into three categories, which represent 
respectively  35%,  40%  and  25%  of  the  total  indirect  cost.  Overhead  in  these  categories  are  then  assigned  by 
assuming cost drivers, in which market A always uses more of the cost driver per unit of sales volume than market 
B. As a result, the cost per unit volume is higher for market A than for market B.   
Low-quality cost report 
        
Total indirect cost = 2,521,118    Cost driver market A  Cost driver market B 
 
 
  Qa:    2,277.25  Qb:   699.3 
 
Indirect costs allocated to markets 
 




Total indirect cost = 2,521,118    Cost drivers market  A  Cost drivers market B 
Split up:   882,391.3 (35% of tot. indir. cost)  0.15 x Qa:     341.6  0.07 x Qb:     49.0 
              1,008,447.2 (40% of tot. indir. cost)  2.30 x Qa:   5237.7  1.20 x Qb:   839.2 
                630,279.5 (25% of tot. Indir. cost)  0.07 x Qa:     159.4  0.04 x Qb:     28.0 
 
Indirect Costs Allocated to Markets  341.6 x 882,391.3      771,790   49.0 x 882,391.3  110,601 
       341.6 + 49.0                                                341.6 + 49.0 
     
  5,237.7x1,008,477.2   869,189   839.2 x 1,008,477.2     139,258 
       5237.7 + 839.2   5237.7 + 839.2 
 
 
  159.4 x 630,279.5        536,191  28.0 x 630,279.5          94,088 
       159.4+28.0       159.4+28.0 
 
            2,177,171      343,947 
                        Per Unit of Volume          956.1                                                          491.8 
 
                                                 






Screenshot of Private Cost Report and Information about the Competitor 
The tables show what participants can observe during each round. They can always observe information about the 
previous six rounds of play. Only players in de UnobservablePrices-treatment do not observe the prices of the 
competitor in the two markets. The figures are calculated based on the initial prices of Experiment 1(Pa L=1650; Pb 
L=1710 for the leader and Pa  F =1645; Pb F=1706 for the follower). A less accurate cost report is introduced as 
‘volume based costing’ while a more accurate cost report is introduced as ‘activity based costing’. For the latter 
costing method, we identify three activities (order processing, software installations and delivery). The costs of these 
activities are allocated to the markets by three activity drivers (number of orders, installations and deliveries). 
 
Historical Information 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 3   Round 4   Round 5  Round 6 
Price Market A             
Price Market B             
Total Profits             
Price Market A 
(Competitor) 
           
Price Market B 
(Competitor) 
           
Total Profits 
(Competitor) 
           
 
VBC [ABC] Report  Report about your competitor 
  market A  margin  market B  margin  Total  Margin      Price market A  1645 
Price 
  1650    1710            Price market B  1706 
Sales Volume
   2277    699    2977
        Total profit  500639 
Revenues   3757463    1195803    4953266           
Cost of goods sold 
  1434668  38.2%  496503  41.5%  1931171  39.0%         
Indirect costs*
   1928815  51.3%  592302  49.5%  2521118
  50.9%         
Indirect costs*  2177171  57.9%  343947  28.8% 
           
  #  costs  #  costs             
  Order processing  341.6  771790  49.0  110601             
  Software installation  5237.7  869189  839.2  139258             
  Delivery  159.4  536191  28.0  94088             
Profits   393980  10.5%  106988  8.9%  500977
  10.1%         
Profits  145624  3.9%   355353  29.7%             
Unit cost   1477.0    1557.0               
Unit cost   1586.1     1201.8               
* are allocated using sales volume as a cost driver 
[#: respectively the number of orders, software installations and deliveries] 
 
 
                                                 
8 Adapted from Cardinaels et al. (2008) 